I posted a comment on
hahathor's post about evangelical atheists, and since I never followed up on my post about it here, I figured I'd repost part of the comment here.
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The thing that spurred me into asking [whether atheist evangelism was any better than religious evangelism] was this: I saw a documentary about evangelists where someone explained that, if you truly believe that someone you love will go to Hell because they are not a Christian, then shouldn't you do everything you can to prevent that loved one from going to Hell? It does make logical sense, if you accept the assumptions of Sin and Hell. And it made me think, hypothetically speaking, if I truly believe that someone I love is doing damage to themselves because of their religion, then shouldn't I do everything I can to convince them otherwise? For instance, suppose I knew a Christian Scientist who was suffering from a treatable illness, but who refused medical treatment in favor of prayer. If I cared about this person, shouldn't I try to convince them that medical treatment is far more likely to be effective than just prayer? Maybe this doesn't count as evangelism, since I'm not trying to convert them completely to atheism, just away from a particularly egregious corollary of their religion. But it falls into the category of "disabusing others of their beliefs". This is an extreme example, but I think this is the kind of motivation that spurs people to talk someone out of a religious belief: the stereotype is that religious people do some irrational things based on their religious belief that can sometimes be harmful to themselves or others, and if you think that this might happen, then in theory it's socially responsible to try to change their mind. But, yeah, in practice it's usually just rude.To be clear, I personally think evangelism of any sort is usually a bad idea, not just because it's rude, but also because in general it's dangerous to assume that you know better than someone else what's good for them. But I think the motivations of atheist evangelists can be as virtuously-intended as religious evangelists who want to save your soul from eternal damnation.
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's list of things that would persuade him of the existence of God. I agree with most, of these, all if I make a few qualifications, and could easily greatly extend my personal list of events which would convince me of the existence of God.
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You believe that you live in Massachusetts, right? Is this falsifiable, or a dogmatic unfalsifiable belief? If not what would convince you otherwise? Make sure that what you specify is so clear and unambiguous that you couldn't possibly weasel out of it in any way.
I think that there is sufficient evidence that God does not exist to warrant belief in that statement. You don't. But I'm willing to accept that reasonable people can disagree. But you are certain that I'm wrong, wrong, wrong, and that you know for a fact that I can't possibly be reasoning from the evidence, and insulting me by accusing me of dogmatism and intellectual dishonesty. There is rudeness and lack of willing to accept the existence of legitimate differing points of view in this conversation, but it's coming from the agnostic, not the atheist.
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Some prophecies are vague or trivial enough that they would not convince me there is a God. Others would clearly persuade me of this. Others are a middle ground. If my goal was to determine the truth about the existence of God, I would do my best to evaluate a given fulfilled prophecy fairly, and decide in which category it fell in. If my goal was to hold to my belief that God did not exist regardless of the evidence, I could claim that prophecies were trivial when they were not. But that would be intellectually dishonest. It's hard for me to understand the content of the post I'm replying to unless you think that I, the writer of the web page, and anyone else who claims to hold a falsifiable belief that God does not exist, are all intellectually dishonest in this way.
Here's a specific example, to convince you my belief is falsifiable. If the holy book of a religion predicted the winner of the world series for ten consecutive future years, other than a prediction involving a lack of winner (because of a baseball strike, for example) for more than one of those years, and it makes no more than 100 incorrect predictions of world series winners, I would consider that prophecy non-trivial. (The last clause is needed to prevent someone from writing a "holy book" that contains a google or so predictions, one of which will turn out to be correct).
Do you think that if I hadn't written that paragraph, that I would have claimed, should a holy book make such a correct prediction, that this prediction was "trivial"? Do you think the author of the web page would have claimed it was trivial? I don't think so, and I don't think you do either. So I don't see what bearing the fact that we *could* claim it to be trivial has on the subject of falsifiability. There might be some predictions that you would find non-trivial that I find trivial, or vice versa. But unless you think I'm completely intellectually dishonest, and would claim any prediction that came true to be trivial, I don't understand your point.
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You have something backwards. The question "is the non-existence of God falsifiable" is the question "is there something that would falsify this belief, that is, establish that God exists", so I think I spoke to the quesstion of whether the non-existence of God is falsifiable.
Since we were talking about the beliefs of atheists, not of your beliefs, I thought you meant "atheists have an unfalsifiable belief in the non-existence of God", that is, "nothing could happen that could convince them that their belief is incorrect, and God actually exists". But you seem to be claiming instead that the proper standard is "nothing could happen that could convince *you* that the belief is incorrect". This seems an odd definition of religious belief. To say my belief is religious if there's no observation that could convince me it's wrong seems like a somewhat reasonable definition. But to say that *my* belief is religious if there's nothing that could occur that would convince *you* that it's false seems very odd to me.